Vulnerabilities
Last updated 5 hours ago
| Package | Summary | Severity | Published | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|
bandit
|
Quadratic CPU blow-up reassembling fragmented WebSocket messages in Bandit | Unknown | 4 months ago | 1 day ago |
bandit
|
HTTP/1 chunked decoder infinite loop on requests with trailer fields in bandit | Unknown | 6 months ago | 1 day ago |
bandit
|
HTTP/1 chunked body reader ignores length cap in bandit | Unknown | 6 months ago | 1 day ago |
bandit
|
Unvalidated HTTP/1 request-target authority lets a client choose conn.host and conn.port in Bandit | Unknown | 1 month ago | 1 day ago |
bandit
|
SETTINGS and stream-0 WINDOW_UPDATE frames trigger quadratic work over blocked streams in Bandit | Unknown | 27 days ago | 1 day ago |
bandit
|
HTTP/2 request bodies made of 1-byte DATA frames amplify memory use in Bandit | Unknown | 25 days ago | 1 day ago |
bandit
|
HTTP/2 connection-window starvation pins Plug processes indefinitely in Bandit | Unknown | 3 months ago | 2 days ago |
bandit
|
HTTP/2 header field values containing CR, LF or NUL are passed to the application unvalidated in Bandit | Unknown | 3 months ago | 2 days ago |
bandit
|
HTTP/2 WINDOW_UPDATE and SETTINGS frames reset the request body read timeout in Bandit | Unknown | 27 days ago | 2 days ago |
bandit
|
Quadratic bignum parsing of Content-Length and Host port values in Bandit | Unknown | 27 days ago | 2 days ago |
bandit
|
WebSocket fragmented message reassembly unbounded in bandit | Unknown | 6 months ago | 2 days ago |
bandit
|
WebSocket permessage-deflate inflate has no output-size cap in bandit | Unknown | 6 months ago | 2 days ago |
bandit
|
CL.CL HTTP request smuggling via duplicate Content-Length in bandit | Unknown | 6 months ago | 2 days ago |
bandit
|
Client-supplied URI scheme trusted without transport verification in bandit | Unknown | 6 months ago | 2 days ago |
bandit
|
HTTP/2 frame size limit checked after body is buffered in bandit | Unknown | 6 months ago | 2 days ago |
bandit
|
Client-chosen HPACK encoder table size is applied uncapped, growing per-connection state with every response in Bandit | Unknown | 27 days ago | 2 days ago |
bandit
|
HTTP/1.1 chunked request bodies made of 1-byte chunks amplify memory use in Bandit | Unknown | 27 days ago | 2 days ago |
bandit
|
HTTP/2 cookie crumb join expands a small HPACK header block into an unbounded allocation in Bandit | Unknown | 27 days ago | 2 days ago |
bandit
|
WebSocket frames keep reaching the WebSock after a server-initiated close in Bandit | Unknown | 27 days ago | 27 days ago |
bandit
|
HTTP/2 StreamError recovery rolls back connection state and bypasses per-connection limits in Bandit | Unknown | 27 days ago | 27 days ago |
bandit
|
WebSocket 1-byte continuation frames bypass `max_fragmented_message_size` in Bandit | Unknown | 27 days ago | 27 days ago |
bandit
|
Chunk extensions accept bare LF and CR, enabling request smuggling in Bandit | Unknown | 27 days ago | 27 days ago |
bandit
|
HTTP/2 inbound flow control is not enforced, letting a client queue unbounded DATA in stream processes in Bandit | Unknown | 27 days ago | 27 days ago |
bandit
|
HTTP/2 blocked-send deadlines reset on every WINDOW_UPDATE, letting a trickle pin stream processes indefinitely in Bandit | Unknown | 1 month ago | 1 month ago |
bandit
|
Bandit: Unauthenticated one-shot DoS via `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` | High Risk 7.5 | 6 months ago | 5 months ago |
bandit
|
Bandit: Unauthenticated DoS via chunked request trailers in Bandit HTTP/1 decoder | High Risk 7.5 | 6 months ago | 5 months ago |
bandit
|
Bandit trusts client-supplied URI scheme on plaintext connections | Medium Risk 6.0 | 6 months ago | 6 months ago |
bandit
|
Bandit Buffers Unbounded WebSocket Continuation Frames, Allowing Unauthenticated Memory Exhaustion | High Risk 8.0 | 6 months ago | 6 months ago |
bandit
|
Bandit HTTP/2 Frame Size Limit Bypass via Late Buffer Check Enables Memory Exhaustion | Medium Risk 6.0 | 6 months ago | 6 months ago |
bandit
|
Bandit is vulnerable to CL.CL request smuggling via unrejected duplicate `Content-Length` header | Medium Risk 6.0 | 6 months ago | 6 months ago |
bandit
|
Bandit's unbounded WebSocket inflate causes BEAM OOM with a single frame | High Risk 8.0 | 6 months ago | 6 months ago |
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