Vulnerability RUSTSEC-2026-0584
Summary
gRPC `IpKeyExtractor` keys on client-supplied forwarding headers
Details
tonic_middleware::IpKeyExtractor is documented as rate limiting gRPC requests by client IP address, but on a standard tonic server it keys on client-supplied x-forwarded-for and x-real-ip headers. In 0.5.0–0.9.1, the extractor reads those headers directly; in 0.10.0–0.11.0, it first checks for a bare std::net::SocketAddr request extension—which tonic::transport::Server never supplies, as it provides TcpConnectInfo instead—and falls back to the same headers. Direct clients can therefore choose their rate-limit key to bypass per-IP rate limits and increase the number of tracked keys; without forwarding headers, 0.5.0–0.9.1 allow requests without limiting them and 0.10.0–0.11.0 reject them by default unless .fail_open() is enabled.
Applications are affected if they use GrpcRateLimitLayer with IpKeyExtractor (the tonic-support feature). The HTTP middleware's IpKeyExtractor reads ConnectInfo<SocketAddr> and is not affected.
Version 0.11.1 fixes IpKeyExtractor to honor a server-supplied SocketAddr override first and then read the TCP peer address from tonic's TcpConnectInfo (which tonic::transport::Server attaches to plaintext connections and connections using its built-in TLS), without ever reading forwarding headers. Deployments behind a trusted proxy can use the new opt-in ForwardedIpKeyExtractor, which reads a single configured header (x-forwarded-for or x-real-ip) and is only correct when that proxy sets the header as documented.
If you cannot upgrade to 0.11.1, use a custom key extractor that reads the peer IP from tonic's connection information for the transport in use (including TLS) and rejects requests without a verified peer address before invoking the limiter, or restrict backend access to a trusted proxy that strips all incoming x-forwarded-for and x-real-ip fields and sets one x-forwarded-for value to the verified client IP on every request.