Vulnerability RUSTSEC-2026-0333
Summary
Resource budgets not enforced on the typed deserialization path
Details
ParserConfig::max_events, max_nodes, max_total_scalar_bytes, max_merge_keys, alias_anchor_ratio and the alias jump factor were enforced only by the two Value loaders. A typed target with a default-shaped configuration is served by the streaming deserializer, which never read those fields, so tightening any of them had no effect on from_str::<T> for a struct target. The default document-length, depth and alias-count caps were enforced on every path, so no input was unbounded; the gap affects callers who tightened the other budgets for hostile input.
Version 0.0.53 charges every budget on the streaming path as well and adds cross-path parity tests.
Users who cannot upgrade can deserialize into noyalib::Value first and convert with from_value, or rely on max_document_length and max_depth, which were always applied on every path.
