Vulnerability MAL-2026-18916

@xyrozero/baileys-mod is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that silently subscribes the installer's own WhatsApp account to WhatsApp Channels chosen by the publisher. When the socket connects, code in lib/Socket/socket.js sends the WhatsApp w:mex FOLLOW query for a list downloaded at runtime from https://raw.github.com/skyzopedia/NewsletterID/refs/heads/main/VIP_Push.json (the URL itself stored as character-code arrays), using the victim's authenticated session and without telling them. Same behaviour as the PhantomSub family (MAL-2026-17342).

Update 2026-11-06: 8.0.14 also carries a second covert path. lib/Utils/messages-media.js exports loadBase, which makeNewsletterSocket (lib/Socket/newsletter.js) calls on every socket creation as loadBase(newsletterWMexQuery, QueryIds). 80 seconds later it fetches a channel list from a URL stored as base64 and, 5 seconds apart, calls newsletterWMexQuery(id, QueryIds.FOLLOW) for each entry, swallowing errors and logging nothing. lib/Utils/messages-media.js sha256 657662b2ae2e8cc1808715d8219d4e7ca7182f6eacda8d79b1cee4b721c88939 (byte-identical to @rixxcodex/baileys 8.2.0); the URL decodes to https://raw.githubusercontent.com/skyzopedia/Screaper/refs/heads/main/idChannel.json. CyberXYZ read every published version statically from the npm registry tarballs on 2026-11-06 (integrity verified); nothing was executed. Amazon Inspector described the same loadBase loop in @rixxcodex/baileys (MAL-2026-16483).