Vulnerability GHSA-xfqj-r5qw-8g4j

Summary

Several API endpoints in authenticated mode have no authentication at all. They respond to completely unauthenticated requests with sensitive data or allow state-changing operations. No account, no session, no API key needed.

Verified against the latest version.

Discord: sagi03581

Steps to Reproduce

1. Unauthenticated issue data access

GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues returns issue data for a heartbeat run with zero authentication. Every other endpoint in server/src/routes/activity.ts calls assertCompanyAccess, but this one was missed.

curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/heartbeat-runs/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001/issues
# -> []  (HTTP 200, not 401 or 403)

If an attacker obtains a valid run UUID (from logs, error messages, shared URLs, or by probing), they can read issue data without any credentials.

2. Unauthenticated CLI auth challenge creation

POST /api/cli-auth/challenges creates a CLI authentication challenge with no actor check at all. The handler at server/src/routes/access.ts:1638-1659 skips any auth verification.

curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"command":"test"}' \
  http://<target>:3100/api/cli-auth/challenges
# returns challenge ID, token, and a pre-generated board API key

The response includes a boardApiToken that becomes active once the challenge is approved. Combined with open registration (separate report), this enables persistent API key generation.

3. Unauthenticated agent instruction / system prompt leakage

These endpoints in server/src/routes/access.ts require no authentication:

curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/index
# returns all available skill endpoints

curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/paperclip
# returns the FULL agent heartbeat procedure including:
#   - every API endpoint and its parameters
#   - authentication mechanism (env var names, header formats)
#   - the complete agent coordination protocol
#   - the agent creation/hiring workflow

curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/paperclip-create-agent
# returns the full agent creation workflow with adapter configs

This hands an attacker a complete map of the internal API without authenticating. It also leaks how agents authenticate, how heartbeats work, and what adapter configurations are available.

4. Unauthenticated deployment configuration disclosure

GET /api/health returns deployment mode, exposure setting, auth status, bootstrap status, version, and feature flags.

curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/health
# {
#   "deploymentMode": "authenticated",
#   "deploymentExposure": "public",
#   "authReady": true,
#   "bootstrapStatus": "ready",
#   "version": "2026.403.0",
#   ...
# }

Tells an attacker exactly how the instance is configured, whether registration is available, and what version is running.

Impact

• Data exposure: heartbeat run issues accessible without credentials. Agent instructions and full API structure exposed to anyone.
• Reconnaissance: an attacker can fingerprint the deployment (mode, version, features) and map the entire internal API before attempting anything else.
• Auth bypass stepping stone: unauthenticated CLI challenge creation is a building block for the full RCE chain (reported separately).

Suggested Fixes

1. Add authentication to heartbeat run issues in server/src/routes/activity.ts:

   • GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues -- add assertCompanyAccess like every other endpoint in the same file

2. Add authentication to CLI challenge creation in server/src/routes/access.ts:

   • POST /api/cli-auth/challenges -- add assertBoard at minimum

3. Add authentication to skill endpoints in server/src/routes/access.ts:

   • GET /api/skills/available
   • GET /api/skills/index
   • GET /api/skills/:skillName

4. Reduce health endpoint information -- consider removing deploymentMode, deploymentExposure, and version from the unauthenticated response, or gating the full response behind assertBoard

5. Consider a global auth rejection middleware for all /api/* routes in authenticated mode. Currently unauthenticated requests get actor: { type: "none" } and pass through to next(), relying on each route handler to check individually. A missing check means an open endpoint. Rejecting type: "none" at the middleware level for all routes except an explicit public allowlist (health, sign-in, sign-up, webhooks) would prevent this class of bug entirely.

Contact

Discord: sagi03581

Happy to help verify fixes or provide additional details.