Vulnerability GHSA-frvp-7c67-39w9

The same as the hono core Path traversal in serve-static on Windows via encoded backslash (%5C).

Summary

On Windows hosts, an encoded backslash (%5C) in the request path decodes to \, which the Windows path resolver treats as a separator. serve-static then resolves a single URL segment such as admin\secret.txt into a nested file under the root and serves it, letting an attacker read static files meant to be protected behind prefix-mounted middleware. Directory escape (..) remains blocked.

Details

The router splits paths only on /, so /admin%5Csecret.txt is one segment and middleware on /admin/* does not run. The serve-static guard rejects ./.. and consecutive separators but lets a lone \ through; on Windows the file resolver re-splits it into the protected subtree.

This affects Windows hosts serving static files via the Node, Bun, or Deno adapters that guard a static subtree with prefix-mounted middleware.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can read static files under a middleware-guarded prefix on Windows hosts. The read stays within the configured root; escape outside the root is not possible.