Vulnerability GHSA-5fqc-mrg8-w798

High Risk
HIGH RISK
CVSS Score: 8.6
Score Range: 7.0–8.9
High severity vulnerabilities (CVSS 7.0–8.9). Serious vulnerabilities that should be prioritized soon after critical fixes.
5 hours ago
October 02, 2026 at 06:53 PM UTC
Dulwich: Symlink directory traversal in filter-branch index_filter via cross-commit state persistence
0.23.1 - 1.2.7
0.23.1 - 1.2.7

Summary

Dulwich: Symlink directory traversal in filter-branch index_filter via cross-commit state persistence

Details

Summary

Dulwich's filter_branch.py CommitFilter._apply_index_filter() is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal. When processing commit history, materialized tree entries (including symlinks) persist in the working directory between commits, allowing a symlink from an ancestor commit to redirect file writes from a descendant commit to arbitrary filesystem locations.

Root Cause

_apply_index_filter() at dulwich/filter_branch.py:212 calls build_index_from_tree(".", tmp_index_path, ...) which materializes all tree entries to the current working directory. The finally block (line 229-230) only cleans up the temporary index file (os.unlink(tmp_index_path)) — NOT the filesystem files written to CWD. When process_commit() processes parents recursively first (line 260), files materialized from ancestor commits persist and affect processing of descendant commits.

On dulwich 1.2.7, build_file_from_blob() has no symlink protection, and validate_path_element only validates name patterns, not filesystem state.

Impact

An attacker can craft a malicious repository where running filter_branch with an index filter writes attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations via symlink traversal. This achieves RCE if the write targets .git/hooks/.

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker creates a repository where commit history (linearized) has:
    • Ancestor commit: tree entry evil (mode 120000, symlink → /target_dir)
    • Descendant commit: tree entry evil/payload (mode 100644, attacker content)
  2. Victim clones repository and runs filter_branch with an index filter
  3. process_commit() processes ancestor first → materializes evil as symlink to /target_dir in CWD
  4. CWD is NOT cleaned between commits
  5. Processing descendant: os.path.exists("./evil") → True (symlink exists). build_file_from_blob(blob, mode, "./evil/payload") → open("./evil/payload", "wb") follows intermediate symlink → writes to /target_dir/payload

Suggested Fix

Clean the CWD between commit iterations in _apply_index_filter(), or verify that no intermediate path components are symlinks before writing files.

Reported by zx (Jace)

Impacted packages

Timeline

Published
5 hours ago
October 02, 2026 at 06:53 PM UTC
Fixed (1.2.8)
2 months ago
July 05, 2026 at 03:57 PM UTC
Last Modified
5 hours ago
October 02, 2026 at 07:00 PM UTC