Vulnerability GHSA-35g8-35p8-c8fw

Summary

A russh server can be driven to unbounded heap growth (process OOM / kill) by a peer that speaks only standard SSH messages, in the default configuration.

The peer starts a key re-exchange (sends SSH_MSG_KEXINIT) but never sends the follow-up SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, leaving the server's kex state machine in SessionKexState::InProgress indefinitely. While a rekey is in progress the server's three message-drain paths are all gated off (if !self.kex.active()), but the network-read path stays active, so every SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN the peer sends is processed inline and appends one reply to an unbounded internal queue (priority_receiver, an UnboundedReceiver) that is not dequeued until the rekey completes. Because the peer decides whether the rekey ever completes, the queue — and the server's memory — grows without bound.

This is reproducible end-to-end against a real russh server over a real encrypted transport; see "Proof of concept". A one-line negative control (same flood, no rekey) keeps memory flat, isolating the rekey window as the sole trigger.

Impact

• Availability / DoS. Server RSS climbs at roughly 3.3 KB per CHANNEL_OPEN, driven entirely by the peer, until the process is OOM-killed. In the reproduction one connection pushed the server from ~4 MB to 2.57 GB (and past 4.8 GB against the stock echoserver example) and it was still climbing when the flood was stopped.
• Reached with standard messages, no special configuration. Any handler is affected, including one that rejects every channel (the reply enqueued on rejection is exactly what accumulates). There is no per-connection cap on in-flight channel opens or on the queue, and the queue's sender has no backpressure.
• The peer keeps the connection alive simply by continuing to send, so the inactivity timer never fires.

Affected component

• russh/src/server/session.rs — Session::run tokio::select! loop. The network-read arm is ungated; the three drain paths are gated on !self.kex.active().
• russh/src/server/mod.rs — reply() routes a non-kex message received during a rekey straight to server_read_encrypted (inline processing).
• russh/src/lib_inner.rs — ChannelOpenHandleInner's accept/reject/Drop all send a reply on an UnboundedSender.

Verified on v0.63.1 (commit d3ae702), which is the latest release. The gating logic predates it.

Details

Session::run (russh/src/server/session.rs:631) drives a tokio::select! (:713). Three of its message-drain sites are gated on !self.kex.active():

• the pre-select! batch drain of priority_receiver/receiver (session.rs:680),
• the priority_receiver.recv() arm (session.rs:762),
• the receiver.recv() arm (session.rs:770, which also holds the only other priority_receiver drain at :777).

The fourth arm, r = &mut reading (session.rs:714), is ungated: it reads and processes one incoming packet every loop iteration regardless of rekey state, calling reply() (server/mod.rs:1128).

During a rekey, session.common.encrypted.is_some(), so the strict-kex message-ordering guard (server/mod.rs:1143, which is additionally gated on encrypted.is_none()) does not apply. A non-kex message therefore falls through reply() to session.server_read_encrypted(handler, pkt) (server/mod.rs:1232) and is handled inline. For SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN this reaches the channel-open handling, which hands the application a ChannelOpenHandle.

Whether the handler accepts or (the trait default) rejects, the handle's accept / reject / Drop all send a Msg::ChannelOpenReply on an UnboundedSender (russh/src/lib_inner.rs:560-603; Drop sends AdministrativelyProhibited at :594-603). That sender feeds priority_receiver, declared UnboundedReceiver<Msg> (session.rs:23) and created with tokio::sync::mpsc::unbounded_channel() (session.rs:1522). Its only drain sites are the three arms gated off during the rekey. So each CHANNEL_OPEN processed during the rekey window appends one reply (carrying a PendingChannelOpen = channel params + mpsc ChannelRef + ids, a few KB retained in practice) to a queue that is never dequeued.

Two facts make this unbounded and remote:

1. The server enters InProgress the moment it receives the peer's KEXINIT (server/mod.rs:1153-1158, begin_rekey) and only leaves it upon receiving the peer's KEX_ECDH_INIT. The peer decides whether to ever send that, so the window is attacker-held.
2. There is no per-connection cap on channels or on the priority queue, and the sender is unbounded (no backpressure).

Root cause

The intended design was to buffer packets received during a rekey and replay them afterwards: the fields pending_reads: Vec<Vec<u8>> and pending_len: u32 (session.rs:26-27) exist and are drained at kex completion (server/mod.rs:1194-1198). But nothing ever pushes to pending_reads or increments pending_len (they are dead — confirmed by grep across russh/src/). Instead of being buffered, channel messages received during a rekey are processed inline, and their replies pile up in the unbounded priority_receiver. The missing piece is a bound on — or bounded deferral of — channel processing while kex.active().

Proof of concept

Everything runs inside a container; nothing touches the host.

Lab. poc/Dockerfile builds russh-lab:head from Eugeny/russh @ d3ae702 (v0.63.1), default features (rust 1.91). A raw-SSH-client PoC (poc/poc_rekey_dos.rs) implements curve25519-sha256 / ssh-ed25519 / aes256-ctr / hmac-sha2-256 by hand, completes the handshake and a publickey auth, then:

1. sends SSH_MSG_KEXINIT (server enters kex.active()),
2. never sends KEX_ECDH_INIT (rekey stalls, attacker-held),
3. floods SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN.

A minimal server (poc/poc_server.rs) uses the trait-default channel_open_session (which rejects by dropping the handle), so the measured growth is purely the undrained priority queue, not accepted-channel state.

poc/run.sh runs the attack leg and an identical negative control with no rekey. Fresh run inside the lab, N = 800,000 opens (results/rerun-2026-08-29.log):

=== ATTACK (rekey stall) === (poc_server baseline_RSS=4208KB, N=800000)
  t=2s  server_RSS=667760KB
  t=4s  server_RSS=1599600KB
  t=6s  server_RSS=2556016KB
  t=8s  server_RSS=2566256KB   (flood done; memory retained)
=== CONTROL (no rekey) === (poc_server baseline_RSS=4208KB, N=800000)
  t=2s..t=12s  server_RSS=4208KB   (flat throughout)

• ATTACK: RSS 4,208 KB → 2,566,256 KB (~2.57 GB) and retained after the flood ends — ~3.3 KB per CHANNEL_OPEN, attacker-driven. (An earlier canonical run reached 2.7 GB at 800k opens, and past 4.8 GB against the stock echoserver example at 1.5 M opens — see results/canonical-run.log.)
• CONTROL: RSS flat at 4,208 KB. Without the rekey window the replies are drained normally; TCP backpressure (the client never reads the failure replies) even throttles the flood.

The control isolates the rekey window as the sole trigger. Both legs exercise the real server entry point (Session::run → reply → server_read_encrypted) over a real encrypted transport.

Reproduce: C=russh-lab N=800000 ./poc/run.sh (see poc/POC-README.md).

Remediation

The priority queue carries locally generated channel-open replies, which are non-kex messages the server must not send during a rekey anyway (RFC 4253 §7.1). So the fix is to bound how much channel work is done during a rekey, not to drain the queue mid-rekey. Any of:

• (recommended, minimal) cap the number of non-kex messages processed while a rekey is in progress and disconnect a peer that exceeds it. A stalled/abusive rekey is then torn down after a small constant instead of growing memory without bound. See patch/rekey-message-cap.patch (a ~10-line change local to Session::run, validated in the lab — the attack leg is disconnected after the cap and RSS stays flat; a normal rekey, which completes in one round trip, is unaffected).
• bound / deferred-buffer channel messages during a rekey using the existing (currently dead) pending_reads/pending_len machinery, with a hard cap.
• bound the number of in-flight channel opens per connection and reject beyond it.

OpenSSH does not service new channels mid-kex; matching that intent closes the whole family.