Vulnerability GHSA-2j32-q6rx-h844
Summary
ApostropheCMS: Page REST API authorization bypass
Details
Summary The core page REST API reads full page documents with .permission(false) in getOne and in the all=1 tree dump, bypassing page-type viewRole, visibility: private, and visibility: loginRequired checks. Unauthenticated visitors and low-privilege contributors can read admin-only and non-public page content by _id/slug.
Details packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/page/index.js:
getOne(L456–465):await self.publicApiCheckAsync(req); ... self.getRestQuery(req).permission(false).and(criteria)— noviewRolethreshold, novisibilityfiltering.allhandler (L318–395):getRestQuery(req).permission(false)(L384–385) walks every page type and returns the projection includingvisibility.publicApiCheckAsync(L3044) only checks thatpublicApiProjectionexists — it performs no authorization.- Correct control behaves differently:
piece-type/index.js:getOne(L319–327) usesgetRestQuery(req)without.permission(false)and enforcesviewRole.
PoC
# Anonymous (no session) — private, admin-only page:
curl "http://localhost:3100/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:published"
# → 200 {"_id":"...:en:published","title":"Secret Private Page","slug":"/secret-page",
# "type":"private-type","visibility":"private","secretData":"TOP-SECRET-VALUE-abc123"}
# Anonymous full site-map dump (includes private + loginRequired pages):
curl "http://localhost:3100/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page?all=1" # → 200, full tree
# Contributor (cont_admin) reads full admin-only doc incl. protected field:
curl -b contrib.cookies ".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:published"
# → 200 secretData = TOP-SECRET-VALUE-abc123
# Controls (correctly enforced):
curl -b contrib.cookies ".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page?type=private-type&autocomplete=zz" # → 403
curl -b contrib.cookies ".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:draft" # → 403
Impact Unauthenticated disclosure of visibility: private and loginRequired pages (full documents, not just paths) and of the complete site structure with visibility/type metadata; contributors read admin-only page types and their protected fields. Because _ids are enumerable and leaked by all=1, this is systemic.
Remediation — Remove .permission(false) from getOne/all or re-apply the type's viewRole threshold plus the same visibility/login-required criteria the list and autocomplete paths use (mirror piece-type); make publicApiCheck config-presence-only and add an explicit authorization step per verb.
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